This open access book is about Chinese South China Sea diplomacy, its underlying interests, modalities (bi-, tri-, multilateral), legal norms versus power, and the likely impact of past on future negotiations. This is a promising approach. Jiye Kim summarizes a wealth of studies but often fails to point out how they confirm or contradict each other, leading to confusion about where the argument is going. She concludes with a claim that China strikes a balance between principles (indisputable sovereignty) and pragmatism and that the traces of past negotiations ‘offer vital clues for advancing peaceful resolution in the SCS.’ This seems overly optimistic since the only substantial negotiation is the one leading to the Tonkin Gulf agreement with Vietnam in 2000. Later negotiations have not been about sovereignty to islands or sovereign rights at sea but just about conduct (producing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 2002, a failed agreement on gas exploration with the Philippines and Vietnam, and endless negotiations with ASEAN for a Code of Conduct (COC). While China has not entered into any negotiations over sovereignty to islands or maritime boundaries, it has not invaded any of the Spratly islands occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia or Taiwan. Instead, it has constructed and militarized seven artificial islands on previously unoccupied reefs. China refused to take part in a compulsory arbitration initiated by the Philippines and totally rejected the Tribunal’s 2016 decision. The main source of cautious optimism is less founded on China’s negotiating stand than on its restraint in avoiding direct use of firepower during incidents with other claimant states. Today, this sets China apart from more aggressive great powers.